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Two studies explored triage decision-making in a welfare fraud investigation, 
specifically decisions concerning what evidence to collect when deciding whether to 
pursue a case to prosecution or whether to issue a warning only. An observational 
study revealed that triage decisions appear to be determined by subjective estimates of 
the ease of evidence collection, and that these estimates are influenced by complexity 
of mapping evidence onto fraud types. This hypothesis was explored in an 
experimental study of investigators, managers, and students choosing evidence to 
inform triage decisions for cases that varied according relevance and complexity. 
Students’ selections were unaffected by the nature of the case. In contrast, with a 
simple fraud case, investigators and managers tended to select evidence to support a 
prosecution decision, but with a complex fraud case they selected evidence that 
supported comparative evaluation of prosecution and warning decisions. The results 




Fraud is common in welfare claims, and costs taxpayers billions of dollars. Little is 
known about expertise in welfare fraud investigation, or more generally about the 
decision-making strategies used by crime investigators. The task of welfare fraud 
investigation begins with a triage decision: whether to seek evidence that might lead 
to prosecution or to terminate an investigation and issue a warning designed to 
dissuade clients from further claims. The first study explored the fraud investigation 
process, through field notes, interviews with investigators, and analysis of investigator 
interviews with clients. The study showed that investigators tended to make triage 
decisions, based on the perceived ease with which evidence might be collected. 
Decisions were affected by investigator experience and the ease with which they 
could understand how evidence would discriminate between cases.
A second experiment compared choices made by investigators, fraud case 
managers and students as to what evidence they would seek to make a triage decision.  
Participants were shown case scenarios based on a ‘tip-off’ that indicated evidence of 
fraud. Their task was to choose further evidence in order to decide whether to 
prosecute or issue a warning. The fraud cases differed in how easy it was to map 
evidence onto the underlying fraud activity. Students’ selections were unaffected by 
the nature of the case. In contrast, with a simple fraud case, investigators selected 
evidence to support a prosecution decision, but with a complex fraud case they 
selected evidence that could equally support prosecution and warning decisions. 
The results suggest that investigators are flexible in the strategies they use in 
triage decision-making: they will seek evidence to discriminate between alternative 
case outcomes but only when the case is complex, otherwise they tend to seek 




US Department of Labor statistics indicate fraud is found in 2.67% of welfare 
claims (Department of Labor, 2014). Welfare fraud costs the UK £1.2 billion per 
annum (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013), resulting in at least 350,000 
investigations each year (Button, Shepherd, & Blackbourn, 2016; Hansard, 2012; 
Walsh & Bull, 2013). Most fraud cases concern incorrect disclosure of personal 
circumstances (Walsh & Bull, 2013). For example, an unemployed individual might 
not disclose paid labor to avoid a reduction in benefit. Information that prompts the 
investigation of welfare fraud comes largely from anonymous ‘tip-offs’. The quality 
of information in tip-offs ranges from highly detailed and substantively accurate to 
vague, inaccurate, and sometimes malicious.
There are approximately 5000 fraud investigators in the UK, working in teams 
of 25-30 in major cities (Smith, Button, Johnston, & Frimpong, 2011). An 
investigator is allocated each tip-off to investigate. Although procedural guidance 
exists, there is considerable discretion as to how the investigation should be managed, 
such as what information to gather, and when and how to close the investigation. 
Cases assessed as yielding robust evidence are selected for in-depth enquiries, to 
attempt to gain enough evidence for prosecution. Cases where it is deemed that 
evidence is unlikely to be gained are the subject of ‘civil’ rather than criminal 
investigations. Here, an investigator interviews the claimant to gain either an 
admission or denial. Admissions lead to a civil warning, with a termination of the 
benefit claim and repayment. Regardless of whether an admission or denial is 
obtained, this interview signals the end of a civil investigation. Investigators make 
their decisions based solely on details contained in the allegation, and their own 
estimation of the likely success of a prosecution. Choosing between criminal or civil 
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investigations is a key decision point because, once an investigator decides to resolve 
the case with a civil warning, switching to a criminal investigation is impossible 
because prosecution outcomes require that all evidence is collected with regard to 
relevant criminal legislation from the outset. 
The number of fraud cases is large, and so a key task is triage - investigators 
must decide whether claimants should be prosecuted (a criminal investigation) or 
simply discouraged from making with a warning (a civil investigation). Triage 
involves decision-making under uncertainty, and is central to other domains such as 
medical diagnosis and criminal investigation. Little is known about the nature and 
flexibility of strategies used to make diagnostic decisions. Studies of expertise, 
ranging from chess (Simon & Gilmartin, 1973) to firefighting (Klein, 2004), have 
revealed experts often make rapid decisions based on recognition and retrieval of an 
action sequence. Novices, lacking relevant experience, rely instead upon general-
purpose heuristics (Anderson, 2014), although experts may resort to general-purpose 
heuristics when a scenario is unfamiliar (e.g., DeStefano, Linstead, & Grey, 2011).
Here, we examine the strategies used by welfare fraud investigators to triage, 
and whether there are consistent biases in evidence selection. We report two empirical 
studies of welfare fraud investigation expertise: an observational study using 
interviews and work placement observations; and an experiment to test a hypothesis 
generated from the observational study concerning the relationship between 
experience and evidence prioritization.
Investigative Decision Making
When individuals seek evidence to test a hypothesis, they should in principle 
gather diagnostic evidence that discriminates between competing hypotheses. 
However, it is widely recognized that evidence selection shows confirmation bias, a 
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tendency to bolster the current hypothesis by seeking evidence that is consistent with 
it while disregarding inconsistent evidence (Nickerson, 1998). For example, Doherty, 
Mynatt, Tweney, and Schiavo (1979) found that, given one piece of evidence 
pertaining to a hypothesis, participants were more likely to seek new evidence about 
that hypothesis than to seek the same evidence for an alternative hypothesis.
If investigators favor an initial hypothesis to the exclusion of alternatives, this 
calls into question their ability to test hypotheses effectively.  Even experienced 
investigators can make sub-optimal evidence selections. For example, criminal 
investigators (Meissner & Kassin, 2002) often assume guilt from the outset, referred 
to as a guilt bias (Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003). Even after extensive training 
designed to counter guilt bias, experienced investigators often still exhibit this 
behavior (Dando, Bull, Ormerod, & Sandham 2016). In insurance fraud investigation, 
the premature adoption of a hypothesis of guilt is a cause of investigative failure 
(Morley, Ball, & Ormerod, 2006). Similarly, welfare fraud investigators admitted to 
believing that clients with anomalous claims were guilty before interview, in 
contradiction of their training (Walsh & Bull, 2011). Where evidence is gathered that 
disconfirms guilt, it is judged as of lesser value and may be overlooked (Hasel, 2012).  
Although evidence selection may be subject to bias, experienced investigators 
appear to develop expertise in hypothesis generation and testing. This has been 
demonstrated in police phone-call triage, scene-of-crime analysis, and hostage 
negotiation, where investigators adopt a range of strategies for generating and testing 
hypotheses depending on factors such as risk, criticality and frequency of the crime 
incident under investigation. (Dando & Ormerod, 2017; Fahsing & Ask, 2016; 
Ormerod, Barrett, & Taylor, 2008).  Welfare fraud teams have a number of different 
roles. Case investigators follow leads, collect evidence, and interview the claimants. 
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Their managers make resource decisions (e.g., deciding what types of cases to focus 
on). As well as having more experience, all managers are promoted from an 
investigator role.
Study 1: Observational Study
A mixed-methods approach was undertaken involving an ethnographic of 
benefits fraud investigation practices, and analyses of interviews between 
investigators and claimants suspected of fraud (a detailed description of these 
interviews is given by Walsh & Milne, 2008; Walsh & Bull, 2010).  The aim of the 




The first author conducted the ethnography. He was a senior investigations 
manager in the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), the UK agency for social 
security benefits administration, involved in the investigation of social security 
benefit fraud for 20 years until 2006. The ethnography comprises both formal and 
informal field notes and interviews collected in the last five years of his role in DWP. 
Interviews were conducted with 89 investigators (n= 57), investigation trainers 
(n= 12), national investigation inspectors (n= 6) and managers (n= 14). The overall 
mean years of experience of the investigators was 12.61, SD = 7.55 (range 2-29 years’ 
experience), trainers (M =17.83, SD = 7.11, range 9-24 years), inspectors (M = 17.50, 
SD = 5.79, range 8-23 years) and managers (M = 15.86, SD = 5.13, range 7-25 years). 
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The interviews were semi-structured, and comprised conversations with 
trainers and managers, as well as performance appraisal interviews with 31 
investigator line-managed by the researcher. The mean duration of the interviews was 
50.66 minutes (SD = 18.10, ranging from 15-75 minutes). The interviews were 
analyzed, using thematic analysis (framed from an interpretive phenomenological 
basis), based on hand-written contemporaneous field notes. Questioning typically 
involved open enquiry designed to elicit reasons for undertaking a chosen course of 
action during investigations, based either on hypothetical scenarios or, in the case of 
investigators, actual cases. Examples of such questioning include:
• During an appraisal, researcher in his role as line manager, questioning an 
investigator: “What you would do given the claimant is is reported to be working 
and claiming benefits and that work... he’s doing just occasional work for an 
unknown employer...where its.. is reported that ...when he does appear to go to 
work, he leaves between 7.30 am and 9.30 am”. 
• During a case conference between investigators, in a case of a woman claiming 
benefits on the basis of her living alone whereas she was alleged to be living with 
her boyfriend:  “So... why did you choose to interview the benefit claimant 
immediately rather than first gather documentary evidence such as utility bills or 
check other available records that might...might well have given some indication 
as to the length of time ... the two  had been living together as a couple.. because 
that is providing retrospective evidence of fraud”.  
Interviews with Claimants
A sample of 241 recorded interviews conducted by investigators with suspects 
of welfare fraud between 1999-2006 were supplied, of which 20% (48) interviews 
were randomly selected for analysis. These interviews were coded and analyzed for 
Triage decision-making
9
key themes using a Grounded Theory approach, which is well suited for this research 
because it supports the derivation of categories directly from the data rather than from 
pre-conceived hypotheses. The interviews were supplied directly to the research team 
following a request from the authors. The organization supplying the interviews were 
blind to the research aims and research questions, but had been provided with an 
overview document outlining the general nature of the research, how the data would 
be analyzed, stored, anonymized, and reported. 
First, the audio data were transcribed verbatim, then the transcripts were 
passed to two coders who independently read each transcript. The focus then shifted 
to open coding, which involved coders working independently to identify behavioral 
concepts within the text, to saturation (Charmaz, 2006), and developing categories 
that represented their meaning in terms of properties and dimensions (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). Throughout, extensive notes were written to summarize the 
researchers’ understanding, interpretations, and connections. Working together, using 
the research notes as a guide (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), categories created in ‘open 
coding’ were then refined to provide more precise and selective codes for behavior 
types. Throughout, behaviors were compared for similarities, violations, and 
differences within and between interviews. Although there were some initial 
disagreements between the three coders about particular categorizations, agreement 
was reached through a process of critical and constructive debate between coders, and 
the authors.  Three primary codes emerged, which we have labeled i) evidence 
handling ii) account handling, and iii) legislation handling (see Table 1; Charmaz, 




Insert Table 1 about here
--------------------------------
Results and Discussion
The observational study set out to establish the nature of fraud investigation 
practices. Table 1 summarizes nine key themes that emerge from the ethnography and 
interviews with claimants. The themes cluster into three categories:  Evidence 
handling (collection, disclosure, exploration); Account handling (gathering, giving); 
and Legislation handling (explaining rights, obtaining information, establishing 
understanding, and inducing admissions). Each category is described as ‘handling’ 
because the categories show a range of strategic approaches adopted by investigators 
to deal most effectively with the evidence coming from a tip-off, the account given by 
(or to) a claimant, or the legal status of a claim.
Our observations revealed that case triage nearly always occurs in the very 
early stages of an investigation. For example, in one field note (identified under the 
‘evidence gathering’ theme) the original allegation claimed that “he always has dirty 
hands when he comes into the office”. The investigator described how he inferred 
from this evidence the implication that the claimant was engaged in some form of 
manual work – such as mending cars, and that this “would be treated quite quickly as 
a case not worth pursuing”. In another case (identified under the ‘evidence 
exploration’ theme), where the tip-off suggested the claimant was working while 
claiming benefits, the investigation yielded a named employer who the investigator 
was familiar with. This led the investigator to state that the employer would keep 
records of employees’ earnings and would be co-operative, and that it was highly 
likely that the matter may be viewed as a potential prosecution case.
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The examples above towards the poles of a continuum from vague to 
substantial suspicion. However, greater subjectivity in decision making was found 
where the originating allegations of wrongdoing lie towards the center. For example, 
a field note from an interview with an experienced investigator (coded under the 
‘establishing understanding’ theme) suggested a key role for legislative practice in 
resolving uncertainty. The investigator stated that “those alleged to be working either 
as, say, a laborer for someone who is in turn self-employed would often reflect 
investigations that possessed no consistent pattern of evidence or information 
gathering, and that isn’t going to stand up in court, is it? In these ... cases I would 
either interview the benefit claimant immediately to seek their responses to the 
allegation, or if that failed undertake efforts to gather evidence or information; but 
mostly I’m going to discontinue the case early doors without any steps being taken... 
on the basis that the investigation would be futile”. 
Even in cases where evidence had been gathered, investigators often made 
independent and quite different decisions as to how to conclude the case. For 
example, one field note (categorized under the ‘account giving’ theme) described a 
team meeting between a manager and three investigators working for her. Four 
different claimants had been under surveillance, which had identified them working 
as taxi drivers.  Each case was assigned to a different investigator, but whereas two 
resulted in a prosecution, the others resulted in a civil outcome (a warning with 
termination of benefit claim; a requirement for repayment of wrongly paid benefit). 
This was despite these cases having the same initial characteristics. In each case, the 
investigators offered a hypothetical account of the circumstances of the claim to the 
manager as a way of justifying their decision. 
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The field notes reveal some inconsistency between investigators in responses 
to tip-offs that trigger an investigation, and also inconsistency of investigative activity 
once an investigation commences. For example, one field note (classified under the 
‘account gathering’ theme) described a case where a welfare claimant was alleged to 
be working for a self-employed builder. The investigator originally assessed at the 
outset that he was potentially capable of gaining the evidence to prosecute. However, 
after failing to contact the builder employer, her decided the investigative activity 
necessary to gain wages records was not worth the effort, as the employer, even if 
they could be contacted, would “…likely be collusive, not keeping records but pay 
wages ‘cash in hand’ and is likely to employ him on an occasional basis anyway…”. 
The investigator stated in the interview with the researcher that they made this 
decision because in their judgment “…it is unlikely to yield the evidence needed for 
proof of criminal wrongdoing”. However, another investigator in a similar case to the 
above (possessing the very same characteristics) made a different judgment as to the 
case merits, continuing to investigate by undertaking surveillance, questioning the 
employer and advising him of his legal requirements in light of what was found after 
undertaking surveillance (in regard to how much work he was doing), or alternatively 
such surveillance did not reveal that he was working as alleged. Thus, the data show a 
level of individual differences leading to triage decision variability, with the 
consequent potential to spend time on cases not warranting such use of resources or to 
discontinue activity on cases that merit further criminal investigation still exists.
A number of investigators in field notes classified under the ‘evidence 
exploration’ theme described how, given that there is little guidance to assist them 
when making such case triage decisions, they use gut instinct to guide their decisions. 
They claimed their prior experiences enabled to make their decisions, citing a number 
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of reasons that influence these decisions, such as their estimated likelihood of gaining 
robust evidence to support a criminal prosecution. Examples involved cases such as a 
woman claiming benefits for her and her children who was alleged to be actually 
living with her husband or boyfriend. Some investigators painstakingly gathered 
documentary evidence to reinforce their suspicions.
Investigators often claimed, in field notes classified under the ‘obtaining 
information’ theme, to start with a ‘prosecution focused’ outlook, seeded by the 
description in the tip-off which necessarily emphasized the potential falsity of the 
claim and guilt of the claimant. Thus, making a ‘civil warning only’ decision was in 
effect over-riding a pre-existing ‘prosecute’ decision. However, despite such claims, it 
was evident from interactions between the researcher and the investigators that the 
point in the investigation when such decision making was made to abandon or 
continue towards a prosecution outcome was highly subjective and value laden. 
The same variability was found when examining investigators’ reasoning for 
decisions. In a field note classified under the ‘establishing understanding’ theme, an 
investigator said that they discontinued with a prosecution focused case because 
surveillance was very difficult in that locality, for example it being impossible to 
observe in a covert manner, or that locals were very ‘surveillance aware’. 
Alternatively, in a field note classified under the ‘evidence collection’ theme, 
documentary evidence obtained from a utility service provider was described as 
‘insubstantial’ with the explanation that similar evidence had failed to secure a 
prosecution in prior investigations. 
One of the managers’ tasks is to make decisions on the weekly ‘themes’ and to 
be alert to trends in claims: For example, one manager reported “We were seeing a lot 
of claim reports involving travelers, so we should drill down on this problem to try 
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and discourage it in our region”. This kind of decision-making reflects a kind of 
sampling and evaluation across cases, looking for commonalities of modus operandi, 
perpetrator and goal. The focus of investigators was almost exclusively on single 
current cases, the only exception being, as exemplified above, when reference was 
made to previous cases during evidence evaluation. 
The way cases were dealt with depended on the perceived complexity of 
mapping evidence onto the suspected fraudulent activity.  For example, in one field 
note (classified under the ‘account giving’ theme), a tip-off was evaluated by an 
investigator which suggested a claimant was receiving a welfare benefit through being 
deemed unfit for work, yet could be seen leaving their home each morning at the 
same time dressed in laboring clothes and carrying building tools. The investigator 
developed a narrative to explain the case: “So its straightforward, the tools show he’s 
working, the clothes, no-one’s going to choose them for social... like events`.  The 
investigator went on to account how how ‘simple’ mappings between the evidence in 
the tip-off and the nature of the suspected fraud, would lead them to focus on 
collecting more evidence that might implicate the claimant: “With something as clear-
cut as that, you want to spend your time looking beyond the tip-off for things that will 
corroborate your decision [to seek prosecution].” 
Other tip-offs were less straightforward. For example, one field note (also 
classified under the ‘account giving’ theme) described a case in which the tip-off 
indicated that a woman was claiming welfare for children who were actually living 
away and looked after by her sister. The investigator stated “its likely she is not 
giving care because we know she has too much free time and parties too much to be 
looking after her kids”.  The ‘evidence’ is not directly related to fraud and requires a 
belief-based inference to link the two.  In cases such as this, investigators reported 
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resorting to more careful case reviews, and consultations with other colleagues. It was 
also suggested that the tougher the case, the more likely an investigator was to 
conclude that prosecution was unlikely and that a decision simply to issue a warning 
was more likely. One investigator reported “When you’ve got to think about it, it 
makes you think differently, and things become a little less obvious”. However, this 
phase of the study did not specifically measure for experience.
Experience was measured directly in examining the skill levels of investigators 
when they interviewed suspects. This analysis revealed that many of the less 
experienced investigators conducted interviews poorly (assessed on a five-point rating 
scale as below the median by the first author – see Walsh & Bull, 2010; Walsh & 
Milne, 2008 for details concerning the measurement scale, and its method of 
undertaking – along with details of measures of inter-rater agreement). One 
determinant of interview quality was whether sufficient evidence was gathered before 
the interview. It was often evident from examining those less skilled interviews that 
more evidence could have been gathered prior to the interview. Across the interviews 
a significant difference was found between the ratings for this task of preparation, 
where those investigators with more than 10 years’ experience (n = 108, M = 2.77 SD 
= 0.84) had higher ratings than those with less than this degree of experience (n = 
133, M = 2.43, SD = 0.98); t(239) = 2.39, p = .026, d = 0.31. 
An example of lower levels of skilled performance by less experienced 
investigators, classified under the ‘inducing admission’ theme, involved an interview 
of a woman by two male investigators who appeared to frighten the female suspect 
into admission of wrongdoing, despite presenting no evidence to her. Another field 
note classified under the ‘explaining rights’ theme involved a case where a less-
experienced investigator relied on circumstantial evidence in the hope of an 
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admission, by suggesting to the claimant that if she withdrew her claim in the short 
term it would not affect her right to claim in the future (a wholly inaccurate statement 
as it transpired).  It appeared as though the investigator was unwilling to exert the 
extra effort of gathering substantive evidence prior to the interview with the suspect, 
hoping that there would be full admission once circumstantial evidence was revealed.   
In summary, the interviews and observations of Study 1 indicated that cases 
vary in complexity, specifically in the ease with which potential sources of evidence 
that are familiar from caseload experience can be mapped in a straightforward way 
onto the current case. Nine themes emerged that illustrate a range of strategies used to 
handle evidence, accounts of that evidence, and the legal framework in which 
evidence can be used.  It is clear that an overriding issue is the extent to which 
evidence can be collected efficiently and used effectively, and estimates of this 
dominate the triage process. There was also some evidence of differing decision 
tactics according to the number of years of experience of investigators, and according 
to role (investigator versus manager). It is important to note that the only measure of 
‘expertise’ per se that we were able to take was in analysis of the interviewer 
performance of investigators. Although this is suggestive of a correlation between 
years of experience and expertise, we cannot claim a definitive relationship.  
Nonetheless, the results of Study 1 suggest that both experience of the investigator 
and the apparent complexity of mapping evidence onto fraud type are important 
factors in triage decision-making. In particular, it appears that more experienced 
investigators make better use of evidence in interviews with claimants, and also 




Study 2: An Experimental Exploration of Triage Decision-Making
In Study 2, we tested the hypothesised relationship between investigative 
experience, case complexity and triage decision-making in an experiment in which we 
presented participants with three scenarios: a simple suspected fraud case in which 
there was a direct mapping between the kinds of evidence presented to participants 
and the characteristics of the specific case under examination, and a complex case in 
which an inference was required to identify which piece of evidence might relate to a 
case. For each case, participants were given a description of the suspected fraud and a 
number showing the percentage of fraud cases where a specific piece of evidence was 
found that led to prosecution. As well as mimicking the real-life role of the “tip-off”, 
this piece of evidence played the role of ‘seed information’ that Doherty et al. (1999) 
used in their studies of hypothesis testing. The ‘seed information’ deliberately sets up 
a hypothesis that a case can be pursued to prosecution. 
The participants’ task was then to select five further pieces of evidence based 
on the percentage of times the evidence led either to prosecution or to issuing of a 
warning only. A non-fraud case (choosing which of two streets a person might have 
left their car) was included to see if effects of experience in investigation were 
specific to cases relevant to the welfare fraud domain or generalized to other 
diagnostic decision-making tasks.
Within a single domain, it is possible to find different strategies and resulting 
biases, depending on the specific functions that individuals carry out. For example, 
Ormerod, Fritz, and Ridgway (1999) found that the categories into which expert 
textbook writers sorted tasks reflected superficial task characteristics (e.g., presence 
of graphics), whereas the categories into which expert designers of examinations 
assessments sorted tasks reflected conceptual task characteristics (e.g., underlying 
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mathematical concepts). Our study examined two types of welfare fraud investigation 
experience: investigator and manager. This role distinction emerged from the 
ethnographic study, where it was found that managers undertook case comparisons 
tasks.  Managers were also more experienced, and the interviews with claimants 
showed that more experienced investigation personnel were more skillful in 
conducting these interviews. We hypothesized that managers would pay more 
attention to alternative hypotheses than investigators, since their task involves 
comparing across cases rather than simply testing specific fraud hypotheses.
Method
Participants
A total of 146 participants took part, 73 investigators (M investigative experience = 
9.9 years), 35 managers (M investigative experience = 19.9 years), and 38 domain-naive 
undergraduate and postgraduate students. The investigators comprised 43 females and 
30 males (M age = 43.81, ranging from 21 to 62 years), the managers 17 females and 
18 males (M age = 48.86, ranging from 21 to 68 years), and the students 16 females 
and 22 males (M age = 31.89, ranging from 21 to 55 years). We chose to differentiate 
the manager and investigator groups by role rather than by years of experience 
because we could not assume a simple correlation between years of experience and 
expertise.  Although the same is true for role, in every case the managers had been 
promoted after obtaining at least ten years investigation experience.  
Materials
The materials used were based on those developed by previous researchers 
(e.g., D’Addario & Macchi, 2012; Feeney et al., 2008; Mynatt, Doherty, & Dragan, 
1993), and comprised a set of instructions and three diagnostic reasoning tasks 
presented in a six-page hardcopy booklet (see Appendix 1). The three problems in 
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each booklet were presented in one of six different orders. Each of the three problems 
was prefaced by a short summary of the background to the problem that described 
two potential case outcomes (equivalent to the alternative hypotheses under test in 
Mynatt et al.  and others’ studies). Start sentence that the case should be prosecuted, 
or that only a warning should be offered.  Then one piece of base rate information was 
presented describing the percentage of instances of co-occurrence with a prosecute 
outcome. Thereafter, a further five pairs of categories of information were provided 
(see Appendix 3) in addition to the choice given in the preface to the problem. The 
instructions explained what was required of participants. They should select five 
pieces of information to help decide between alternative outcomes (to prosecute or 
issue a warning). On the next six pages of the booklet, each of the three problems was 
presented, comprised of a page showing the problem vignette and a page showing the 
evidence of co-occurrence choices. Finally, the booklet provided a debriefing 
statement.
Of the three tasks, two were relevant to the domain of fraud investigation, 
and one was domain-neutral (the ‘house’ problem from Feeney et al., 2008). The two 
fraud investigation tasks had a similar structure: A vignette was presented concerning 
a specific case and each case had six facts that were investigatively relevant.
• Task 1: a woman claiming benefits as a single parent who is suspected of 
living with and being supported financially by her boyfriend; (case details are 
that regular surveillance has showed the boyfriend leaving the claimant’s 
house at the start of the working day and returning there at the end);
• Task 2: a man claiming benefits while working for a building company; (case 
details are that the claimant is thought to be working for a building company 
that hires people on a casual daily basis). 
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For each task, participants were required to select five additional pieces of evidence 
that would help them decide whether to follow an investigation strategy aimed 
towards prosecution. 
The nature of a realistic triage task is that, while investigators might consider 
what evidence would be discriminatory, they do not actually access the evidence until 
an investigation is underway. Therefore, unlike other studies (e.g., Doherty et al., 
1979), where participants were made aware of the percentage of co-occurrence after 
each selection was made, in the current study participants simply chose five items 
whose co-occurrence they would want to find out about.
The tasks differed in the degree of difficulty involved in mapping between 
case facts and co-occurrence evidence.  In the simple task, the mapping between case 
facts and evidence choices was direct and required no inference. For case 1 above, the 
seed information was “the percentage of cases leading to prosecution in which 
surveillance has shown someone suspected of providing financial support to a single-
parent claimant leaving and arriving at the address at times associated with the 
working day”. In the complex task, participants had to make inferences between the 
case facts and the evidence choices. For case 2 above, the seed information was “the 
percentage of cases leading to prosecution in which companies cannot produce 
detailed wage records for all their employees”. Such an evidence choice requires an 
inference to map onto the case fact that “companies that fail to keep wage records are 
also likely to be companies that hire on a casual daily basis”. The task was further 
complicated in that some pieces of evidence had a secondary inferential goal, 
requiring participants to identify whether the individual was likely to be a member of 
Gang A, in which a criminal investigation would be a likely outcome, or Gang B, in 
which a civil investigation would be the likely outcome. Complexity was varied in 
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this way to reflect the reality of cases faced by experienced investigators (Walsh, 
2011). Each fraud task vignette was evaluated by four domain experts with > 20 years 
domain experience, who independently assessed the two case studies, using a five-
point Likert scale for indices of case familiarity, realism and frequency. The vignettes 
achieved a score of at least 4 on each index by all four raters. Strong inter-agreement 
using Kappa measures was found across these scales (minimum 0.90).
Design and Procedure 
This research employed a mixed design, with Group as a between-subjects 
factor (investigators; managers; students) and Task (simple; complex; neutral) as a 
within-subjects factor. The experiment was presented during professional training 
days for the investigator and manager groups, and during lectures for the student 
groups (average group size on each testing occasion = 35 participants). Each 
participant first read the opening instructions on the problem booklet’s front page (see 
Appendix 1 for task instructions). The order of task presentation was counter-
balanced across participants. Furthermore, the order in which evidence items were 
listed was randomized. Participants were given five minutes to individually attempt 
each of the three tasks (which are presented in Appendix 2), making their selections 
using a pen, and without conferring with any other participant.
Results and discussion
The data from 11 participants (4 managers, 3 investigators, and 4 students) 
were removed before analysis, because they failed to provide complete answers to one 
or more of the tasks.
Analysis of selections. The answers provided by each participant were coded 
by the researchers according to the number of pairs of evidence selected. These were 
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then identified as follows: An evidence pair was chosen if the participant chose the 
same evidence item pertaining to each investigative outcome (i.e., the percentage of 
prosecutions given the specific evidence item AND the percentage of warnings only 
given the specific evidence item). Given that participants were given one evidence 
item in the initial vignette and then selected five more, the scores could vary between 
zero (no pairs – entirely selecting for the prosecute outcome seeded in the initial 
evidence) and three (all pairs –comparative across prosecute and warning outcomes 
for each piece of evidence they chose). 
 A Task (simple; complex; neutral) by Group (students; investigators; 
managers) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Task, F
 
(2, 266) = 11.39, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .08. Planned comparisons show that choices for complex tasks (M = 2.08), 
95% CI [1.92 2.24] showed significantly more pairs of prosecute/warning outcome 
selections than for simple tasks (M = 1.51), 95% CI [1.36: 1.67], F (1, 135) = 30.62, p 
< 0.001, ηp2 = .19.  Choices for the neutral task (M = 1.88) did not differ significantly 
from the other tasks, p = 0.59.  
A significant man effect of Group was also found, F (1, 133) = 3.25, p = 0.04, 
ηp2 =  .05 (see Fig. 1 for means and error). Managers, 95% CI [1.81: 2.23] and 
investigators, 95% CI [1.53: 1.84] choices did not differ significantly from those of 
students, 95% CI [1.56: 1.96], p = .46. However, managers’ choices showed 
significantly more pairs of prosecute/warning outcome selections than those of 
investigators, F(2,133) = 6.38, p = .01.
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A significant Task and Group interaction emerged, F (4, 266) = 2.54, p = .041, 
ηp2 = .04. Sheffés post-hoc tests indicate that both managers and investigators chose 
significantly more pairs of prosecute/warning outcome selections for complex tasks 
than simple tasks, ps < .01, with no difference across tasks for students, p > .08. 
Analysis of selection consistency. To examine whether the groups differed 
systematically in the types of evidence they selected, three analysis were conducted; 
one asked whether evidence selections made by participants within each Group were 
more similar than selections made across Groups, one examined whether Groups 
differed according to the types of evidence content they selected, and one compared 
the number of prosecution versus warning only (or King versus Queen Street) 
selections made for each of the tasks by the three Groups as a check for guilt bias 
(Kassin, 2012). 
First, to examine whether the selections of participants reflected Group 
membership, we examined the mean distance of selections between pairs within 
groups (in-group mean distance) against between groups (out-group mean distance) 
across the three tasks. Mean distances were based on the squared Euclidian Distance 
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between pairs of participants as data and average linkage between groups calculated 
using hierarchical cluster analyses.  To derive these means, we calculated the 
Euclidean distance for each participant pair, and then means for participant pairs 
within and between groups. Mean distances varied between 0 (absolute overlap in 
items selected) and 11 (no overlap at all in selections), and essentially indicate less or 
more variability in the selections made by participant pairs. 
A Group (students; investigators; managers) by Task (simple; complex; neutral) 
by Proximity (in-group distance; out-group distance) ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of Task, F
 
(2, 278) = 10.37, p < .01, ηp2 = .07. Sheffé tests revealed that 
simple task selections (M = 4.75, 95% CI [4.65: 4.85]) were more distant than 
complex task selections (M = 4.35, 95% CI [4.18: 4.52]), p < .01. Neutral task 
selections (M = 4.54) did not differ significantly from the other tasks, ps > 0.1.  A 
significant main effect of Proximity was also found, F
 
(1, 139) = 18.81, p < .011, ηp2 
= .12, with shorter distances within groups (M = 4.46, 95% CI [4.36: 4.57]) than 
between groups (M = 4.63, 95% CI [4.53: 4.73]). The interaction between Proximity 
and Group was also statistically significant, F (4, 266) = 2.54, p = .04, ηp2 = .04.  
Sheffés tests indicate that student selections were significantly more distant from 
other groups (M = 4.73, 95% CI [4.60: 4.87]) than within their own group  (M = 4.43, 
95% CI [4.29: 4.56]), p <.01, with no difference in distances from own group and 
others for managers and investigators, p >. 09. No other effects were significant, Fs < 
2.15, ps > .09.
We then assessed whether the investigators and managers systematically 
selected response options different from those selected by the students. We summed 
the frequencies with which each evidence pair were selected (i.e., the ‘prosecute’ and 
‘warning only’ pairs for each of the evidence contents in the fraud-related tasks, and 
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‘Queen Street’ and ‘King Street’ pairs in the neutral task). A series of Chi Square tests 
examined whether the groups differed in the frequencies with which they selected 
each evidence pair (five tests for each task, omitting the seeded evidence pair). Of 
these 15 tests, two were statistically significant (all others p > .12). Investigators 
selected significantly more “percentage of  houses in [King/Queen Street] with net 
curtains in the windows” evidence pairs in the neutral task than the other two Groups, 
χ2 (2) = 6.45, p = 0.004. Similarly, investigators selected significantly more the 
“percentage of investigations, nationally that result in [prosecution/warning only], 
where the claimant had provided a false name for a suspected partner” evidence pairs 
in the simple fraud task than the other two groups, χ2 (2) = 10.67, p = 0.005. 
Third, to examine for evidence of guilt bias, we summed the number of 
‘prosecution’ and ‘warning only’ pieces of evidence (or King Street and Queen Street 
for the neutral task) made by each of the three Groups.  The number of ‘Prosecute’ 
and ‘King Street’ selections (i.e., the ones seeded in the initial evidence item 
presented to participants) made by each group for each task is shown in Table 2. 
-----------------------------------
Insert Table 2 here
-----------------------------------
Overall, more seeded selections were made for the Simple Fraud task (64%) 
than for Complex Fraud task (51%) and the Neutral task (56%), χ2 (2) = 14.12, p = 
0.009.  There were no differences between Groups for the any of the tasks, all ps > 
.12.
The results of Study 2 confirm that triage decision-making is affected by task 
complexity: when the task was simple, student participants tended to make evidence 
selections to test the ‘prosecute’ outcome seeded in the case description. When the 
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case was complex, the investigators and managers made more comparative selections 
than the students, choosing both prosecute and warning only outcomes for each 
evidence topic. As expected, students were unaffected by case complexity, and the 
three Groups did not differ significantly in their selections for the neutral case. These 
findings suggest that the effects are a result of domain experience rather than age, 
education or other demographic differences across groups. 
General Discussion
Two studies examined the possible nature of expertise in welfare fraud 
investigation. The first study used observational methods, and identified triage 
decision-making as a key aspect of the investigation role. Notably, it revealed how 
investigators make judgments about whether to pursue a case based on subjective 
feelings about which evidence for prosecution might be collected.  The apparent 
simplicity of mapping the evidence of the tip-off onto kind of fraud suspected was 
reported as a key factor in decision-making. With simple cases, investigators reported 
a focus on seeking new corroborating evidence, while with complex cases, they 
reported a more evaluative and comparative approach, with more focus on 
considering alternative case outcomes. Any case is always open to alternative 
explanations. For example, while dressed for work with building tools is consistent 
with someone fraudulently working while claiming welfare benefits, it is possible, 
however unlikely, that the claimant was taking the tools each day to loan them to 
someone else. Thus, there is a risk of instinctive judgments in generating the lie bias 
found in other domains. The hypothesis generated in Study 1 concerning a 
relationship between experience of fraud investigation and case complexity was 
confirmed in the experiment conducted in Study 2.  
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  In real fraud investigation situations, there are many sources of evidence that 
can be sampled in order to make a triage judgment. Just as DNA evidence is seen as 
more powerful than eye-witness evidence for achieving a conviction (e.g., Wells & 
Olson, 2003), fraud investigators may be aware that some pieces of evidence are more 
useful than others (e.g., bogus documentation is stronger evidence than an informant’s 
testimonial). Thus, an alternative explanation for our findings is that the evidence 
selections made by investigators are determined by domain knowledge and context, 
that is, an understanding of what types of evidence are likely to prove most useful in 
securing a prosecution.
Some support for this hypothesis comes from an analysis of a mean Euclidean 
Distance measure of selections: Within the student Group selections were similar, 
whereas selections made by the expert groups differed.  However, an analysis of the 
content of selections suggests that this Group similarity does not arise because 
experienced investigators were targeting specific evidence items. Only two out of 15 
differences in evidence item selection were statistically significant. In one instance, 
investigators (when undertaking the simple task) selected more items than the other 
groups. That is, they more often chose “percentage of investigations, nationally, that 
result in [prosecution/warning only], where the claimant had provided a false name 
for a suspected partner”. A putative explanation for this difference is that this is the 
only item where deceit (providing a false name) was explicit in the materials. If 
investigators are selecting to test a ‘prosecute’ hypothesis, then they should be 
influenced by the relevance of this evidence content. However, Manager participants 
did not all focus on this item. 
The other significant difference was with the neutral task, where again 
investigators differed from the other groups in being more likely to select both the 
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“percentage of houses in [King/Queen Street] with net curtains in the windows” 
evidence items. Notwithstanding accounts of ‘nosey’ neighbors spying on welfare 
cheats through ‘twitching curtains’, it is stretching the data too far to interpret this 
difference as reflecting anything other than randomness. Overall, there is little 
evidence that selections were guided by knowledge concerning known evidence 
utility.
As Ormerod et al. (1999) noted, not all experts in a domain are the same kind 
of expert. Their study found differences between experienced designers of educational 
tasks and teachers of educational tasks, the latter tending to sort tasks according to 
conceptually deeper features than the former, despite the fact that task designers start 
off as teachers.  In our study, across all three tasks, the managers’ selections were 
more similar than those of the investigators.  Investigators’ and managers’ jobs differ 
in that the former are tasked with making decisions about individual cases (to 
prosecute or conduct a compliance interview only), while the latter are tasked with 
making resource prioritization decisions across a set of cases (i.e., they must tell 
investigators which cases from a current case load to focus their efforts upon). Thus, 
the estimated utility of evidence in a particular case will, for managers, be a judgment 
relative to the estimated utility of evidence in other cases. This additional layer of 
inferential complexity, we suggest, leads managers towards more comparative 
decision-making. 
Our conclusions require certain caveats. We tested fraud investigation 
performance using only two fraud scenarios and two tasks. This limitation was 
imposed by the realities of working with domain experts, who cannot be taken off 
work tasks for extended periods to undertake research trials. Although the cases were 
pre-tested for familiarity, frequency and realism, it may be that small changes in case 
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content lead to large changes in diagnostic strategy. Further research may benefit 
from exploring a wider range of expertise domains and materials. 
From a practical perspective, our data suggest that task complexity must be 
borne in mind when training investigators.  One common approach used in police 
training is to attempt to ‘de-bias’ individuals by alerting them towards the negative 
consequences of confirmation bias. A similar de-biasing approach was advocated by 
Kern and Doherty (1982) in the domain of medical diagnosis. In our data, we saw 
some evidence for a guilt bias, in the preference for selections by all groups for the 
‘prosecute’ evidence in the Simple Fraud task. However, this bias disappeared with 
the Complex tasks. These data indicate that de-biasing through instruction may be not 
be necessary, whether or not it is appropriate for investigative training, since any 
‘bias’ is highly case-specific and potentially normative for the specific context in 
which it arises. Instead, training should focus upon identifying the right hypothesis-
testing strategy for each case. 
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Frequency (% in brackets) of selections consistent with the presented hypothesis 
(‘prosecution’/ ‘King Street’) by each group for each task
Neutral Task Simple Fraud Task Complex Fraud Task
Students 156 (53) 178 (62) 131 (52)
Investigators 118 (64) 123 (69) 87 (50)
Managers 77 (50) 95 (61) 79 (53)
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Appendix 1: General task instructions
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. You will be asked to complete a 
number of tasks that require you to think about the evidence you need to gather in 
order to choose between two alternative hypotheses. The study should take around 15 
minutes in total.  Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you have the right 
to withdraw at any stage.  The data will be held anonymously.  We are interested in 
how decisions vary according to the type of task undertaken. We will be recording the 
responses you select for each task. We want you to focus on the tasks without 
interruption, but you should not rush since the choices you make are more important 
to us than the speed with which you make them. In this booklet you will find three 
tasks.  Each task requires you to select some sources of evidence that test a 
hypothesis.  Some of these tasks are about benefits fraud, where individuals 
deliberately claim a benefit, such as invalidity or unemployment, to which they know 
they are not entitled. All of the names in the tasks are fictitious.
Imagine you work for the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) as an 
investigator. Your job is to examine potential cases of fraud.  Specifically, in each 
case, you must determine whether it is worth collecting evidence to seek prosecution 
of the suspected fraudster, or whether you will simply interview the individual to 
encourage them to stop claiming benefits without taking them to court. An 
investigator needs to judge whether the likelihood of securing a prosecution is worth 
the time and effort invested in collecting evidence, because collecting evidence can 
cost a lot of taxpayers’ money. However, a prosecution can sometimes be the only 
way of preventing repeated offending. So, you will need to choose pieces of evidence 
that might help you decide whether a case is likely to turn out to lead to prosecution, 
or whether a case should simply be completed by interview. 
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Appendix 2:  Task materials
Simple Fraud case
You can now request five of the following eleven pieces of information to assist you 
in determining whether to pursue and investigation with a view to prosecution or 
claim termination (but no more):
1) % of investigations that result in a prosecution, where credit reference checks 
show that a male has stated that his home address is that of the benefit claimant. 
2) % of investigations where, in a previous investigation the benefit claimant 
provided a false name for a suspected male, and a further investigation leads to 
prosecution.
3) % of cases which result in claim termination (but no more), where credit 
reference checks show that the benefit claimant and a male have both stated (on a 
joint application for credit) that they live at the same address.
4)  % of investigations, where the employer holds a different address for the 
male, that result in a claim termination (but no more).
5) % of investigations where the owner of the vehicle is identified as belonging 
to the suspected boyfriend that result in prosecution.    
6) % of investigations where, in a previous investigation the benefit claimant 
provided a false name for a suspected male, and a further investigation results in 
claim termination (but no more).
  
7) % of cases resulting in claim termination (but no more), where surveillance 
established that a male regularly leaves the property of the benefit claimant.
8) % of investigations that result in a claim termination (but no more) , where 
credit reference checks show that a male has stated that his home address is that of the 
benefit claimant.  
9) % of investigations where, regardless of what address the male’s employer 
holds, the cases results in prosecution.
10) % of cases which result in prosecution, where credit reference checks show 
that the benefit claimant and a male have both stated (on a joint application for credit) 
that they live at the same address.
11) % of investigations where the owner of the vehicle is identified as belonging 






Before you went to the pub last night you parked your car. You know that you left it 
in one of two streets, either Queen St or King St, but it is now the next morning and 
you can’t remember which.
You remember the following details of the house outside which you left the car last 
night:
The house had uPVC windows
The house had a front garden
The house had a two-car driveway
The house had a security light
The house had a “beware of the dog” sign outside
The house had net curtains in the windows
The council database shows that 70% of the houses in Queen St have security lights.
You can now request five of the following eleven further pieces of information to 
assist you in determining whether you left your car in Queen St or King St:
1) The % of houses in King St with net curtains in the windows 
2)  The % of houses in Queen St with uPVC windows
3) The % of houses in King St with a front garden
4) The % of houses in Queen St with “beware of the dog” signs outside 
5) The % of houses in King St with uPVC windows 
6)  The % of houses in Queen St with a two-car driveway
7) The % of houses in King St with security lights 
8) The % of houses in Queen St with a front garden
9)  The % of houses in King St with “beware of the dog” signs outside
10) The % of houses in Queen St with net curtains in the windows




Complex fraud case 
You are trying to identify which of two gangs working on two different sites a benefit 
claimant is with. It is alleged that he has been working with the gang at various sites 
continually for almost a year. One of the gangs (Gang A) work for a building firm that 
is collusive and unreliable and several of the gang are thought to be claiming benefits 
, while the other gang (Gang B) are working for a building firm that are very co-
operative and keep excellent wage records, although it is possible that some members 
of that gang are also claiming benefits.. You know that the benefit claimant lives 
within a mile of where the work is being done but you do not know exactly where the 
work is being done. Whichever gang is involved, they are both undertaking the 
plastering. The benefit claimant has stated, when signing as unemployed, that he is a 
qualified painter and decorator and that is the line of work he is looking for. Two 
outcomes only are possible.  If he has been working for Gang B, you will undertake 
an investigation to bring about a prosecution. On the other hand, if he is working for 
Gang A then it is likely that you will look to investigate the case with a view to 
obtaining a claim withdrawal from the claimant (but no more)
Please choose five of the pieces of information, by circling the relevant numbers.
You have the following pieces of information: 
65% of members of Gang A live within 1 mile of the building site.
Eleven additional pieces of information are also available:
1). % of members of Gang A who are claiming benefits.
2). % of members of Gang A who are decorators.
3). % of claimants who work for reliable employers where investigations result in 
a claim withdrawal (but no more).
4) % of claimants who work for unreliable employers who are prosecuted after 
an investigation.
5) % of cases resulting in claim withdrawal (but no more) that involve claimants 
working as painters and decorators.
6)  % of members of Gang B who live within 1 mile of the building site. 
7) % of members in Gang B who are claiming benefits.  
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8)  % of claimants who work for reliable employers who are prosecuted after an
investigation.
9) % of members of Gang B who are decorators.
10) . % of claimants who work for unreliable employers where investigations result 
in a claim withdrawal (but no more).




Appendix 3: Percentage of selections of each item of information for each task 
made by each group (S = students, I = Investigators, M = Managers). 
1. Non-fraud task








King St with net curtains in the 
windows 33 20 15 10
Queen St with uPVC windows 30 19 16 6
King St with a front garden 27 20 9 7
Queen St with “beware of the dog” 
sign 83 52 32 28
King St with uPVC windows 13 8 5 5
Queen St with a two-car driveway 74 45 27 28
King St with security lights 61 37 22 23
Queen St with a front garden 33 18 19 8
King St with “beware of the dog” 
sign 72 49 21 27
Queen St with net curtains in the 
windows 39 22 24 7
King St with a two-car driveway 61 40 16 27
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2. Simple fraud task










result in prosecution, where another person 
gives claimant’s address. 59 36 27 17
result in prosecution, where claimant 
provided a false name for a partner. 55 28 30 16
end in interview, where claimant and 
partner have joint credit application. 50 36 14 18
end in interview, where employer holds a 
different address for a partner. 24 10 9 13
result in prosecution, where another person 
owns vehicle at the claimant’s address.    57 35 21 21
end in interview, where claimant provided 
a false name for a partner. 28 14 18 6
end in interview, where surveillance shows 
partner leaves claimant’s house each day. 64 40 27 19
end in interview, where surveillance shows 
partner leaves claimant’s house each day. 36 24 10 14
result in prosecution, where employer 
holds a different address for a partner. 42 28 18 11
result in prosecution, where claimant and 
partner have joint credit application. 80 51 27 30
end in interview, where another person 
owns a vehicle at the claimant’s address.    28 25 4 9
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3. Complex fraud task








cases leading to prosecution in which 
companies cannot produce wage records.  72 44 28 25
members of Gang A who are painters and 
decorators. 64 40 24 23
members of Gang B claiming welfare benefits. 21 12 10 6
cases leading to prosecution where companies 
fail to meet regulatory standards. 30 21 12 7
cases leading to interview where companies 
employ casual labourers out of normal hours. 22 10 15 5
members of Gang B live within one mile of the 
building site. 83 54 31 27
cases leading to interview only in which 
companies cannot produce wage records.  70 42 26 27
members of Gang A claiming welfare benefits
24 12 12 9
members of Gang B who are painters and 
decorators. 70 44 23 27
cases leading to interview only where 
companies fail to meet regulatory standards. 24 13 14 6
cases leading to prosecution where companies 
employ casual labourers out of normal hours 30 14 11 15
